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I interpret the European Central Bank’s two-pillar strategy by proposing an empirical
model for inflation that distinguishes between the short- and long-run components
of  inflation. The latter component depends on an exponentially weighted moving
average of  past monetary growth and the former on the output gap. Estimates for
the 1971–2003 period suggest that money can be combined with other indicators
to form the ‘broadly based assessment of  the outlook for future price developments’
that constitutes the ECB’s second pillar. However, the analysis does not suggest that
money should be treated differently from other indicators. While money is a useful
policy indicator, all relevant indicators should be assessed in an integrated manner,
and a separate pillar focused on monetary aggregates does not appear necessary.
— Stefan Gerlach
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘Pillar. 1. A detached vertical structure of  . . . solid material, . . . used either as a
vertical support of  some superstructure, as a stable point of  attachment of  some-
thing heavy and oscillatory, or standing alone as a conspicuous monument or
ornament; . . .’ (The Compact Edition of  the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. II, 1984,
p. 2175).
As the above quotation illustrates, the term ‘pillar’ has several meanings ( in fact, the OED
gives another eleven definitions of  ‘pillar’). It is perhaps therefore not surprising that
after more than five years of  operation, the monetary policy strategy of  the European
Central Bank (ECB) remains highly controversial. Initially announced in October
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1998, the hallmark of  the strategy is the use of  ‘two pillars’ in formulating and setting
monetary policy.1 The first pillar, which is defined as a:
‘prominent role for money, as signalled by the announcement of  a reference value
for the growth of  a broad monetary aggregate’,
has remained the object of  a lively debate and has been subject to intense criticism.2
For instance, Begg et al. (2002, p. xiv), writing in the CEPR Monitoring the European
Central Bank series, state that:
‘the first pillar of  the monetary strategy is now flawed beyond repair – both as a
matter of  theory and empirically’.
By contrast, the second pillar, defined by the ECB as a:
‘broadly based assessment of  the outlook for future price developments and the
risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole’,
has been accepted by the public and the economics profession as a natural part of
any active monetary policy strategy. Of  course, all central banks that gear monetary
policy to achieving and maintaining price stability presumably rely on such an assess-
ment in setting interest rates. So why has the monetary pillar become so exceedingly
controversial?
1.1. The issues
One reason for the controversy as regards the ECB’s monetary pillar is that observers
have failed to detect any relationship between the growth rate of  M3 and interest rate
decisions taken by the Governing Council of  the Eurosystem. With the exception of
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003), econometric estimates of  reaction functions for the
euro area typically fail to find that money growth plays a role in the ECB’s interest
rate decisions. Furthermore, in commenting on the reasons for its policy decisions,
the Governing Council has repeatedly stated that episodes of  rapid money growth
were due to special factors and/or shifts in the demand for money arising from
changes in portfolio preferences or in the opportunity cost of  holding money. For
this reason, it interpreted the observed money growth as not signalling ‘risks to price
stability’ and therefore chose to disregard it. Galí et al. (2004) review the statements
1 The ECB’s policy framework is reviewed in ‘The stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of  the Eurosystem’, ECB Monthly
Bulletin, January 1999, pp. 39–50. For a non-technical review, see ECB (2004). The role of  money in the strategy is discussed
in ‘Euro area monetary aggregates and their role in the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy’, ECB Monthly Bulletin, February
1999, pp. 29–46. Svensson (1999) contains an early but still highly relevant critique of  the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. See
also Svensson (2002).
2 Reviewing the critique of  the two-pillar framework goes beyond the scope of  this study. In Box 1, I instead summarize the
analysis in the last report in the CEPR series on Monitoring the ECB 5 (Galí et al. 2004), which provides a critical review of  a
number of  arguments in support of  the first pillar.
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about economic conditions in the Editorials in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin and
conclude that the Governing Council typically interpreted money growth as not
worrying even when it exceeded the 4.5% reference value (see also Gerlach, 2004).
Strikingly, despite the fact that money growth was above the reference value between
July 2001 and September 2003, the Governing Council never took the view that
rapid money growth warranted a tightening of  monetary policy.3
An arguably more important reason for the controversy surrounding the frame-
work is that the ECB has not spelled out in detail its view of  the exact role of  money
in the inflation process and in the setting of  interest rates. Indeed, the ECB has never
provided a formal explanation for why it believes that money growth and prices are
linked over time and, in particular, why it interprets this relationship as reflecting
causation, rather than merely correlation. Indeed, as noted by Galí (2003), a direct
relationship between money growth and inflation arises from the existence of  a stable
money demand function irrespectively of  the monetary policy strategy followed by
the central bank. Furthermore, in discussing the role of  money in its strategy and
conduct of  policy the ECB has tended to use imprecise terminology. For instance, it
has emphasized the ‘medium-term’ orientation of  the framework and has repeatedly
used the notion of  a ‘monetary overhang’ but has never given these concepts unam-
biguous definitions. It has also asserted that money growth has been disturbed by
‘special factors’ without necessarily being too clear about whether they were of  a
once-off  nature or could be expected to return. Many observers have arguably inter-
preted this, rightly or wrongly, as the ECB having given the monetary pillar an extra
degree of  freedom by its choice of  terminology.
For the ECB to overcome the scepticism that surrounds the monetary pillar, it
needs to provide a clearer explanation of  the role of  money in the inflation process
than it has to date. This necessarily requires a formal, estimable model of  the inflation
process and the role of  money in it. The existence of  such a model would naturally
shift the debate from the general level that characterizes the exchange between
the ECB and its critics today, to the concrete level at which economics is typically
debated in the literature. Instead of  arguing about whether the framework is
‘sensible’, the debate would move to technical questions such as whether the model
could be derived from first principles, how it should be estimated, whether the
resulting estimates are stable over time, whether the empirical results provide
support for the two-pillar model, and so on. It is precisely for this reason that
central banks, in particular those with inflation targets, tend to make public the
models they use to forecast inflation. Formalization is helpful in that it makes
3 In presenting the framework, however, the ECB did emphasize that it would not change interest rates automatically in response
to changes in money growth: ‘the concept of  a reference value does not entail a commitment on the part of  the Eurosystem to
correct deviations of  monetary growth from the reference value of  the short term. Interest rates will not be changed “mecha-
nistically” in response to such deviations in an attempt to return monetary growth to the reference value.’ (ECB Monthly Bulletin,
January 1999, p. 49).
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it possible to pin down the exact nature of  the disagreement(s) and the areas of
agreement.
In light of  this, one would have expected the ECB to put forth a formal model of
its framework. Rather than doing so, however, when discussing its two-pillar strategy
(ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2000, pp. 37–48) it has stated that:
‘it has proven extremely difficult to integrate an active role for money in conven-
tional real economy models . . . despite the general consensus that inflation is
ultimately a monetary phenomenon’ (p. 45).
In discussing the two pillars, it has gone on to assert that:
‘it is not practically feasible to combine these two forms of  analysis in a transparent
manner in a single analytical approach’ (p. 46).
While seemingly innocuous, these statements are thought provoking. Why, one may
wonder, did the ECB adopt a monetary policy framework that it has found difficult
to rationalize using standard macroeconomic analysis? Isn’t the mere fact that it is
difficult to formalize the two pillars in a clear and transparent fashion a good reason
to worry about, or even doubt, the usefulness of  such a policy framework?
Given the need for a model of  the ECB’s two-pillar framework, seeking to formalize
it should be high on the research agenda. This paper provides an attempt to do so
by proposing a simple ad hoc empirical model of  inflation in the euro area.4 The
model, which incorporates money growth in a Phillips curve, interprets the two
pillars as separate approaches to forecasting inflation at different time horizons. The
first pillar – the monetary analysis – is seen as a way to forecast inflation at long time
horizons and to account for changes in the steady-state rate of  inflation (or in the
average rate of  inflation over a few years). Empirically, I associate the first pillar with
an exponentially declining moving average of  M3 growth.5 The second pillar – the
economic analysis – is understood as the ECB’s way to predict short-run movements in
inflation around that steady-state level. The model identifies the output gap with the
second pillar; a more elaborate version would need to consider also other determi-
nants of  temporary swings in inflation, including import and energy prices, changes
in value added taxes and so on.
4 There are several other studies on the role of  money in the euro area, but, with the exception of  Neumann (2003), these do
not focus on interpreting the two-pillar framework as I do here. Andrés et al. (2003), following Ireland (2002), study the role of
money by estimating a small-scale dynamic general equilibrium model in which real balances may affect the marginal utility of
consumption, but find no evidence for such an effect. Coenen et al. (2001) estimate a model in which money contains informa-
tion about output, which is measured with error. Andrés et al. (2004), Kajanoja (2003) and Lippi and Neri (2003) estimate
forward-looking money-demand models that imply that money may contain useful information about the state of  economy that
is not embedded in currently observed variables.
5 Of  course, the ECB’s monetary analysis extends beyond simply understanding the nature of  M3 growth.
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1.2. Outline and main results
The paper makes two contributions. The first of  these is to demonstrate, as others
have done before, that money growth does contain information about future inflation
in the euro area and that money therefore can serve as an information variable. I
argue, however, that the analysis does not support the notion that money should be
treated any differently from other information variables and, in this sense, does not
point to a need for a separate monetary pillar. Indeed, the second contribution of
the paper is to show how money growth can be integrated with other information
variables to forecast inflation and to form the ‘broadly based assessment of  the outlook
for future price developments and the risks to price stability’ that constitutes the second
pillar of  the ECB’s framework.
Section 2 characterizes briefly the joint behaviour of  inflation and money growth
in the euro area. I show that these variables are closely correlated. Section 3 presents
some evidence to the effect that (a measure of ) money growth contained information
for future inflation in the 1970–2003 period, even after accounting for the informa-
tion in past inflation and the output gap. Estimates for subperiods show that while
money was informative for future inflation in the 1970–86 period, the information
content declined after 1987. Section 4 argues that the two-pillar framework must
ultimately rely on a two-pillar view of  inflation. It goes on to propose an empirical
model of  inflation – a ‘two-pillar Phillips curve’ – that integrates money with a standard,
although forward-looking, Phillips curve and provides a composite forecasting model
for inflation. Section 5 proceeds to estimate the model using data for the 1971–2003
period. Without going through the results in detail here, I argue that the model fits
the data well. Section 6 provides estimates for two subsamples. The first of  these spans
the high inflation period 1971–91, and the second the low inflation period 1992–2003.
Perhaps surprisingly, I find that the model fits well also in the latter sample period.
Four boxes and two appendixes complement the analysis in the main part of  the
paper. Box 1 summarizes the analysis in the last report in the CEPR series on
Monitoring the ECB (Galí et al., 2004), which provides a critical review of  a number of
arguments in support of  the first pillar. Box 2 surveys research published by the
ECB on the information content of  money growth for inflation. Box 3 reviews how
the role of  money growth in the ECB’s policy strategy was changed as a consequence
of  the review of  the framework that was completed in May 2003. Box 4 provides
a formal statement of  the empirical model and the resulting inflation equation that
I estimate. Appendix 1 provides some new results on the usefulness of  money in forecast-
ing inflation in the euro area and Appendix 2 derives the inflation equation that I
estimate.
In Section 7 I conclude by turning to the central question whether the model and
the broader literature on money growth and inflation provide support for a monetary
pillar. I claim that money growth is about as useful for predicting future inflation in
the euro area as the output gap, and that it consequently makes good sense for the
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ECB to monitor monetary developments in the same way as it assesses other indica-
tors of  price pressures. Next I turn to the question of  the monetary pillar. I argue that
while money is a useful policy indicator, all such indicators should be assessed in an
integrated manner. Thus, I do not believe that the analysis implies that a separate
monetary pillar is necessary.
Box 1. Monitoring the ECB 5
Reviewing in detail the large literature criticizing the two-pillar strategy would
go far beyond the scope of  the present paper. This box instead summarizes the
analysis of  a number of  claims in favour of  a monetary pillar in the most recent
of  the annual reports by the CEPR on ‘Monitoring the ECB’, entitled, The
Monetary Policy Strategy of  the ECB Reconsidered (Galí et al., 2004; needless to say,
my interpretation of  these arguments may or may not coincide with those of
my co-authors).
One argument in support of  the first pillar is that money may be a proxy for
variables that are observed with a lag or not at all. For instance, output gaps, which play
an important role in most central banks’ analysis of  inflation, are unobserved
and measures thereof  must be constructed using data that are published with
a lag and may undergo repeated revisions. Since money growth data are
rapidly available and money may be correlated with income, it could potentially
be used to improve assessments of  the current output gap. However, the report
argues that other, non-monetary variables are likely to be more informative
than money for this purpose. Furthermore, even if  money did contain useful
information, there is no reason to give it a separate pillar. Rather, the infor-
mation in money should be used together with other indicators in forming a
broader view of  economic conditions.
A further alleged reason for why it may be helpful to monitor money
growth is that money may play an important role in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. The report analyses this argument but concludes that while
it may well be correct, it would suggest looking at more direct measures
of  the financial conditions of  firms and households than the growth rate of
the broad money stock. Moreover, also in this case would it be natural to
undertake this work as a part of  the economic analysis underlying the second
pillar.
Another claim for why money growth needs to be monitored is that high
inflation is always associated with rapid money growth, which in turn suggests
that monetary control is essential for ensuring long-run price stability. While the report
does not dispute that growth rates of  money and prices are frequently closely
related (in the sense that money and prices may be cointegrated), it argues that
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this is not sufficient to justify a monetary pillar. A finding of  cointegration does
not imply that prices adjust to money. In a multivariate setting in which money
and prices are cointegrated with, say, income and interest rates, the adjustment
to equilibrium may be carried out by movements in the latter variables rather
than money or prices. Thus, money being high relative to prices might well
lead to lower money growth in the future. Moreover, to the extent that prices
adjust, they need not do so rapidly. Overall, cointegration between money and
prices does not impose much restriction, if  any, on the short-run behaviour of
inflation. Optimizing inflation control therefore requires policy-makers to focus
on other, short-run factors that are presumably captured in the economic
analysis of  the second pillar.
It is sometimes asserted that while the economic analysis of  the second pillar
may serve to ensure price stability in the short term, this is not sufficient to safeguard
price stability in the long run. Here the report takes the view that maintain-
ing price stability month-by-month presumably must imply maintaining
it over the long run as well. Moreover, while the report is open to the
notion that there could indeed be potential medium-term risks to price stabil-
ity, it argues that the ECB’s strategy does not at all spell out what policy
reactions these should elicit as long as that threat remains merely potential.
The usefulness of  indicators of  medium to long-term risks to price stability is
therefore unclear.
It has been argued that conducting monetary policy with an eye on money growth may
be useful for avoiding the trap of  discretionary policy-making with a resultant increase in
inflation. While avoiding an inflation bias due to discretionary policy is desirable,
the report concludes that this problem is better solved by the ECB committing
itself  to following an appropriately designed policy rule rather than adopting a
two-pillar strategy.
Yet another argument in favour of  monitoring money is that the two-pillar
strategy leads to more robust decision-making by cross-checking the implications for
interest rates of  alternative models of  inflation. While the report recognizes the
need for such cross-checking, this could presumably be done in the context of
the economic analysis in the second pillar, which should take into account
all information regarding inflation pressures including information about the
role of  money growth in the inflation process. The report also notes that
the ECB has never spelled out in detail what the role of  money is in the
alternative models of  the inflation process it has in mind, and that the ECB
appears to view monetary analysis as providing an escape clause for policy.
Thus, the ECB seems to argue that although that analysis does not lead to
formal inflation forecasts, it helps guard against inflation gradually rising
above the objective. The report is recognizant of  the need to guard against this
and notes that limiting money growth may be one way in which persistently
high inflation can be avoided. However, it goes on to argue that a more
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natural and better way to achieve this is simply to monitor actual inflation
developments.
The final argument considered by the report is the claim that monitoring
monetary aggregates is essential to preventing instability due to self-fulfilling expectations.
The report analyzes this argument, but concludes that many of  these
problems can be overcome with interest rate rules (see the discussion in
Woodford, 2003). The potential exception is the case of  self-fulfilling deflation-
ary traps in case of  which the report argues that a commitment by the
central bank to maintain money balances at a level above that required to
keep the interest rate at zero may be desirable (as discussed by Eggertsen and
Woodford, 2003). However, this is only necessary in specific circumstances, and
does not generally involve cross-checking in the form of  a two-pillar policy
framework.
My own interpretation of  the report is that it takes the view that the ECB
would be ill advised to disregard monetary factors, but that taking proper
account of  these does neither necessarily entail monitoring the growth rate of
M3, nor does it require a separate monetary pillar.
2. MONEY GROWTH AND INFLATION: EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES
To motivate the subsequent analysis, it is useful to start by looking at the behaviour
of  inflation and money in the euro area. Figure 1 shows the evolution of  CPI inflation
and money growth since 1971.6 Following the practice of  the ECB and most other
central banks, both growth rates are computed as the change over four quarters. The
figure tells a familiar story: money growth and inflation were both high in the 1970,
declined and reached a low around 1986, and then accelerated until 1991. Subse-
quently both decelerated before increasing somewhat towards the end of  the sample.
The ECB views these correlations as reflecting the impact of  money growth on
future inflation. In the Monthly Bulletin of  February 1999 (p. 39), it provides a figure
of  an eight-quarter moving average of  four-quarter inflation and money growth, with
money growth led six quarters, presumably because this captures the lag between
movements in money and prices. Figure 2 provides an updated version of  this plot,
with the data starting in 1972Q4 and ending in 2003Q1. To facilitate a comparison,
the sample period used in the figure in the Monthly Bulletin is also indicated.
The figure shows a close relationship between the two series. However, that
relationship was somewhat less close in the 1972–83 and the 1999–2003 periods
that were not included in the figure in the Monthly Bulletin.
6 Prices are measured by consumer prices, money by M3 and output by real GDP. All variables are seasonally adjusted. The
data set and information about its construction are available at http://www.economic-policy.org.
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Figure 1. CPI inflation and M3 growth
Figure 2. CPI inflation and M3 growth (6 quarters earlier)
Note: Shaded area indicates sample used in the ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 1999.
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Of  course, the quantity theory suggests that the relationship between money
growth and inflation depends on output growth and on velocity. While the ECB
has taken the view that velocity is declining at a broadly stable rate over time (see
Brand et al., 2002), income growth does fluctuate. Figure 3 therefore contains a plot
of  inflation together with the growth rate of  M3 minus the growth rate of  real GDP ( in
what follows, I refer to this as money growth adjusted for income growth or ‘adjusted
money growth’).7 The relationship between inflation and adjusted money growth
is perhaps even closer than the relationship between inflation and money growth.
However, Figure 4, which is constructed in the same way as Figure 2, does not
show any lag between adjusted money growth and inflation. This casts some
doubt on the empirical regularity emphasized by the ECB in motivating the mone-
tary pillar.
Further evidence on the relationship between money growth and prices in the euro
area is provided by Gerlach (2003) who, following Cogley (2002), studies the behav-
iour of  exponentially weighted moving averages of  inflation and adjusted M3 growth
obtained using a simple filter.8 Here I simply note that applying the filter to an
economic series, or ‘filtering’ the series, produces a more slowly moving series that I
7 Alternatively, it could be thought of  as the growth of  money per unit output.
8 In a paper related to Gerlach (2003), Neumann (2003) employs the Hodrick–Prescott filter to obtain a two-sided moving
average of  money growth and uses the resulting time series to model inflation in the euro area. Jaeger (2003) uses spectral
analysis to study the relationship between money growth and inflation in the euro area in the short and long run.
Figure 3. CPI inflation and adjusted M3 growth
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refer to as the ‘trend’ version of  the series in question. Thus, applying the filter to
money growth, adjusted money growth or inflation generates ‘trend money growth’,
‘adjusted trend money growth’ and ‘trend inflation’. The extent of  the filtering
depends on a ‘smoothing parameter’ which determines how smoothly the filtered
series evolves over time. I assume the 0.075 value used by Gerlach (2003), which
implies a half-life of  9.2 quarters; in the econometric analysis below I estimate this
parameter (see Box 4 below for technical details).
Because of  velocity shocks, there is no reason to expect a one-to-one relationship
between trend inflation and money growth. To see more clearly the correlations
between the variables, I therefore transform the data so that they have zero mean
and unit variance. Figure 5 plots filtered inflation and M3 growth and Figure 6
plots filtered inflation and adjusted M3 growth. The figures show a close relation-
ship between trend inflation and money growth, in particular adjusted money
growth.9
Overall, these informal time series plots are supportive of  a tight link between
money and inflation in the euro area and are no doubt one reason why the ECB
believes that a two-pillar framework is appropriate. As noted above, however, a
relationship between money growth and inflation arises from the existence of  a
9 Lucas (1980) discusses how filtering can be used to clarify the relationship between inflation and money growth.
Figure 4. CPI inflation and adjusted M3 growth (6 quarters earlier)
402 STEFAN GERLACH
Figure 5. Filtered and normalized CPI inflation and M3 growth
Figure 6. Filtered and normalized CPI inflation and adjusted M3 growth
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money demand relationship. Thus, these figures are silent on the critical issue
whether it is money growth that leads to inflation or inflation that leads to money
growth.
3. MONEY AND PRICES: REDUCED-FORM EVIDENCE
Next I characterize the relationship between money growth and inflation somewhat
more formally. While the figures reviewed above suggest that different measures of
money growth are correlated with future inflation and therefore may contain infor-
mation useful in judging ‘risks to price stability’, they by no means provide any firm
evidence to that effect. For money to be a useful information variable, it must be that
it contains information that is not already embedded in past inflation rates or other
traditional indicator variables, in particular measures of  the output gap. A large body
of  research conducted by the ECB and others demonstrates that money growth does
contain such information (see Box 2). As a prelude to the econometric analysis, I
explore the information content for future changes in inflation of  the trend money
growth measure discussed above.
Box 2. Money and inflation in the euro area
Much of  the research on the relationship between money and prices in the
euro area has focused on modelling the demand for money and has been
contributed by the staff  of  the ECB. Masuch et al. (2003) summarize work in
this area by the ECB; its predecessor, the European Monetary Institute,
also conducted research on this issue: see, e.g., Fagan and Henry (1998).
Coenen and Vega (2001) study quarterly data on real M3, real income, short
and long interest rates and inflation for the period 1980–98. After testing for
weak exogeneity, they estimate a single equation error-correction model, which
appears stable and well behaved, for the demand for the real money stock.
Brand and Cassola (2000) study the same variables over a slightly longer
sample, and estimate a system comprising three long-run relationships. They
also find a well-defined money demand relationship and detect no evidence of
instability.
Calza et al. (2001) investigate the demand for money in the euro area. In
contrast to the earlier literature, the authors focus on measuring the opportu-
nity cost of  holding M3 and argue that it is best captured by the spread
between short-term interest rates and the own return on M3. They also esti-
mate a system consisting of  a demand equation for the real money stock and
an equation for the opportunity cost. This system appears to have good statis-
tical properties and to be stable. Fagan et al. (2001) estimate a money demand
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function as one equation of  their econometric model of  the euro area in which,
as noted by Begg et al. (2002), money plays a purely passive role. Brand et al.
(2002) study the income velocity of  money in the euro area, which is of  import-
ance in the determination of  the ECB’s reference value for M3 growth. They
find a well-defined empirical relationship between money, income, prices
and the opportunity cost of  holding money. However, there is some limited
evidence that the income elasticity of  money demand has risen from 1992Q1
onwards.
The models studied above all focus on the demand for the real money stock,
and find that it moves over time to offset monetary disequilibria as captured
by an error-correction term. One unfortunate implication of  the use of  the real
money stock in the analysis is that the results are silent on whether it is the
nominal money stock or the price level (or both) that adjust to offset disequi-
libria. Thus, these models do not permit conclusions to be drawn regarding
the role of  money in the inflation process.
The relationship between money and prices has been addressed directly by
Trecroci and Vega (2000). They argue that while money does not appear to
Granger cause inflation, that conclusion depends on the information set used
in the forecasting exercise. Moreover, they find that the ‘p-star’ model – or,
equivalently, the real money gap model of  Gerlach and Svensson (2003) –
indicates that money is informative about future inflation. Although the
authors argue that the model can be refined, they show that it provides better
longer-term forecasts of  inflation than the non-monetary inflation equation in
the econometric model of  Fagan et al. (2001). Nicoletti-Altamari (2001) per-
forms a simulated out-of-sample forecasting exercise to study the information
content of  money for prices in the euro area. The results suggest that monetary
and credit aggregates provide useful information about price developments,
particularly at medium-term horizons.
Batini (2002), in an ECB working paper, studies the relationship between
money and prices in the euro area in a model-free manner. She finds that
money growth, which she interprets as a measure of  overall monetary condi-
tions, impacts on inflation with a time lag of  over a year.
While the findings discussed above are all compatible with the notion that
money contains information that is useful in predicting inflation, it should be
remembered that the results stem from non-structural models. They are
therefore arguably best seen as establishing the empirical regularities that are
to be explained.
Overall, I interpret this literature as indicating that money has predictive
content for inflation in the euro area. However, the output gap is also relevant
for forecasting inflation.
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My approach is similar to that of  Cogley (2002), who uses (what I call) trend
inflation as a measure of  core inflation and asks whether the discrepancy between
headline and trend inflation is useful for predicting future changes in headline
inflation. More formally, Cogley explores whether the change in headline inflation over
the coming j quarters is predictable on the basis of  the current spread between trend
and headline inflation. He also generalizes this approach by asking how these results
change if  other variables are included in the analysis. As additional variables I incor-
porate the output gap and the spread between current trend money growth and trend
inflation. My principal interest is to explore whether this latter variable is statistically
significant and how it contributes to the explanatory power of  the regression.
Before turning to the results three comments are in order. First, I focus on the
wedge between trend money growth and trend inflation since it plays an important
role in the analysis below and since its information content has not previously been
studied. Of  course, other measures of  money, in particular ‘headline’ money growth,
could also be used. Second, this is a reduced-form relationship. Woodford (1994)
demonstrates that the usefulness of  an information variable (in my case money
growth) for forecasting a target variable (in my case inflation) depends on the policy
regime in force. Woodford’s argument implies that the correlation between money
growth and inflation can be zero even if  money is a structural determinant of  infla-
tion. Thus, a finding that money growth does not contain information about future
inflation does not necessarily imply that money growth is irrelevant, from a structural
perspective, for price formation. Moreover, the information content of  money may
shift over time in response to changes in the policy regime. Third, econometric work
on the usefulness of  information variables is inherently subject to the critique that
the results are only valid in the estimation period. Since I am interested in whether
a proposed information variable is operational at monetary-policy relevant time
horizons, say 1–3 years ahead, one needs at least a sample several times longer
than that to assess the information content. This makes it difficult to formally explore
the hypothesis that money has lost its significance since the establishment of  the
ECB.
Appendix 1 contains a detailed discussion of  the empirical work and the main
results. For my purposes, the most important findings are:
• Trend money growth (relative to trend inflation) does generally contain informa-
tion about future changes in headline inflation. The exact information content
depends on the time horizon (2, 4, 8 and 12 quarters) and sample periods studied
(1970–2003, 1970–1986 and 1987–2003). In particular, while money growth
helps predict future inflation for all time horizons in the pre-1987 and the full
sample, it appears significant only at the 2 and 4 quarter horizons in the post-
1986 sample.
• The information in money growth is not already embodied in the output gap and
the wedge between headline and trend inflation.
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• The information in the output gap appears to have gained importance over time.10
In particular, the output gap is about as significant as money growth in the
post-1986 sample, but much less significant in the pre-1987 sample.
• These findings are important in that they provide a formal indication of  the
information content of  money for future inflation.
4. A TWO-PILLAR PHILLIPS CURVE
In this section I present my interpretation of  the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.
I start from the hypothesis that the strategy must be based on, at least implicitly,
a ‘two-pillar’ view of  inflation. The task I face, therefore, is to construct a model for
forecasting inflation in which money plays an integral and non-trivial role.
As a first step, it is useful to clarify my interpretation of  the ECB’s view of  the
inflation process. This is difficult because the importance that the ECB has attached
to money has evolved over time. In particular, the review of  the monetary policy
framework which the ECB announced in 2002 and which was completed in 2003 led
to a reassessment of  the role and importance of  money (see Box 3 for greater detail).
Box 3. The ECB’s 2003 review of the monetary policy strategy
In October 1998, the Governing Council of  the ECB announced the main
features of  its monetary policy strategy, the core of  which is a quantitative
definition of  price stability and a two-pillar framework for assessing the risks to
price stability. After more than three years of  experience, the ECB stated in
2002 that it would review the framework. The outcome of  this evaluation was
made public in May 2003. While it considered both the quantitative definition
of  price stability and the two-pillar framework, in the interest of  brevity I
focus here on the implications for the monetary pillar. Galí et al. (2004) contains
a detailed analysis of  the overall outcome of  the review.
While the review does not say so explicitly, my interpretation of  it is that the
Governing Council decided to maintain, but to downplay, the monetary pillar
(von Hagen and Hofman 2003). Three notable changes were made.
First, the Governing Council appeared to change, or at least clarify, the
motivation for the monetary pillar. When the two-pillar strategy was first intro-
duced, the ECB argued that, given the high degree of  uncertainty under which
policy is conducted, the two-pillar strategy ‘reduces the risk of  policy errors
10 This is evidenced by the fact that the adjusted R-squared from, and the significance of  the slope parameter in, the univariate
regressions are systematically higher in the second sample.
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caused by the overreliance on a single indicator or model. Since it adopts a
diversified approach to the interpretation of  economic conditions, the ECB’s
strategy may be regarded as facilitating the adoption of  a robust monetary
strategy’ (ECB, Monthly Bulletin, November 2000, p. 45).
It went on to argue that a specific concern was the fact that the inflation
process was so poorly understood. On the same page, it stated that ‘A reflection
of  the uncertainties about, and the imperfect understanding of, the economy
is the large range of  models of  the inflation process . . . Many of  these models
capture important elements of  reality, but none of  them appear to be able to
describe reality in its entirety. Therefore, any single model is necessarily incom-
plete. As the set of  plausible models is very broad, any policy analysis needs to
be organised within a simplifying framework. The ECB has chosen to organise
its analysis under two pillars.’
Thus, when it was initially announced, the ECB motivated the two-pillar
strategy by appealing to the risks that could arise from putting too much faith
in any single hypothesis of  the price mechanism.
After the conclusion of  the review, the ECB continued to emphasize that
the two-pillar framework was intended to avoid an excessive reliance on a single
conceptual model of  inflation (ECB, 2003, p. 17): ‘Monetary policy faces
uncertainties about the functioning of  the economy. The ECB’s monetary
policy strategy was designed with the aim of  ensuring that no information
is lost and that appropriate attention is paid to different analytical
perspectives . . . The two-pillar approach is a means to convey the notion of
diversification of  analysis to the public and ensure robust decision-making on
the basis of  different analytical perspectives.’
However, following the review, the ECB’s motivation focused on the need
to combine information with different time dimensions (ECB, 2003, p. 18; see
also the quotes in Section 4): ‘Overall, the two-pillar approach provides a
framework for cross-checking indications stemming from the shorter-term
economic analysis with those from the monetary analysis, which provides
information about the medium to long-term determinants of  inflation.’
Moreover, in the summary article in the June 2003 Monthly Bulletin, it writes
that: ‘The Governing Council . . . indicated that monetary analysis mainly serves
as a means of  cross-checking, from a medium to long-term perspective, the
short- to medium-term indications coming from economic analysis’ (p. 87).
Overall, it seems that the motivation for the two-pillar approach changed as
a consequence of  review.
Second, the Governing Council decided to adopt a new structure for the
President’s Introductory Statement to the ECB’s monthly press conference by
reversing the order in which the information coming from the two pillars is
presented. Thus, it was decided that the statement henceforth would start with
the broadly based economic analysis under the second pillar before turning to
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the monetary analysis of  the first pillar. One plausible explanation for this
decision is that the economic analysis provides more information about the
Governing Council’s view of  near-term inflation pressures, and therefore about
the likelihood of  interest rate changes, than the monetary analysis. I therefore
believe this signals a reduction of  the importance attached to the monetary
pillar. This is supported by the fact that since December 2003, the term ‘pillar’
is no longer used in the editorials of  the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, which contain
a discussion of  the Governing Council’s view of  economic developments and
its assessment of  the need for interest-rate changes.
The third change concerns the reference value for money growth. While the
Governing Council in the past had reviewed this on an annual basis, it decided
to discontinue this practice. This decision reflected the fact that since the monetary
analysis pertained to the medium to long term, there would presumably be
little reason to consider updating the reference value on an annual basis.
Despite this, I believe that the ECB’s view is based on the following three propositions:
• Monetary policy impacts on inflation with a lag. It is therefore important to give
monetary policy a ‘medium-term orientation’ and to forecast inflation at the time
horizon relevant for monetary policy.
• Inflation depends on many factors. In the short run, it is largely influenced by
cost variables (in particular energy prices and wages), the output gap, import and
food prices, taxes and changes in administratively set prices. In the long run,
however, it is determined solely by monetary factors. In the time horizon relevant
for monetary policy, both sets of  factors play a role and the central bank therefore
faces a non-trivial forecasting problem.
• To assess the outlook for inflation at the medium-term time horizon, it is helpful
to decompose inflation into two components or pillars. The first pillar is intended
to capture the monetary factors that are useful for forecasting the long-run
evolution of  the price level. The second pillar is intended to reflect the factors
that are helpful for predicting short-run movements in inflation.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the important conceptual difference between the
pillars concerns the forecasting horizon that they apply to. This interpretation seems
compatible with the ECB’s own statements. In particular, in discussing the outcome
of  its widely noted review of  the framework, it writes:
‘The two pillars are: economic analysis to identify short- to medium-term risks to price
stability; and monetary analysis to assess medium to long-term trends in inflation,
given the close relationship between money and prices over extended horizons.’11
11 See ‘The outcome of  the ECB’s evaluation of  its monetary policy strategy’, ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2003, pp. 79–92, in
particular p. 79.
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It goes on to state that:
‘The inflation process can be broadly decomposed into two components, one
associated with the interplay between demand and supply factors at a high
frequency, and the other connected to more drawn-out and persistent trends . . .
The latter component is empirically closely associated with the medium-term
trend growth of  money.’12
Furthermore, in an overview article directed to the scholarly community, the ECB (2003,
p. 18) writes about the two pillars that:
‘One aspect of  this approach relates to the different time perspectives relevant to the
analysis under the two pillars. This builds on the well-documented findings that
long-term price movements are driven by trend money growth, while higher
frequency inflation developments appear to reflect the interplay between supply
and demand conditions at shorter horizons. Against this background, the broadly
based economic analysis gives higher-frequency indications for policy decisions
based on the assessment of  non-monetary shocks to price developments and the
likely evolution of  prices over short to medium-term horizons. Monetary analysis
and indices of  monetary imbalances, on the other hand, provide information
against which these indications can be evaluated and the stance of  policy can be
cross-checked from a longer-term perspective’ (emphasis in the original).13
Thus, there can be little doubt that the main difference between the two pillars
pertains to the time horizon they are supposed to be relevant for. Next I propose a
model of  inflation that combines monetary and non-monetary factors in this spirit.
4.1. The empirical model
Box 4 spells out the central elements of  the model and the inflation equation that I
estimate. Below I provide a non-technical discussion.
Box 4. The model
This box spells out the empirical model in detail. First I consider the filter
discussed in the text. Sargent (1979, ch. 11) studies a consumption function in
which permanent income is determined according to this filter. He states that
Muth (1960) shows that this filter is compatible with the assumptions about
expectations formation made by Friedman (1956).
12 Ibid., p. 87. See also Box 2 on p. 90.
13 Interestingly, on the same page the ECB writes ‘[t]he medium to long-term focus of  the monetary analysis implies that there
is no direct link between short-term monetary developments and monetary policy decisions.’
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Let xt denote the annualized quarterly growth rate of  some series. The
smoothed or filtered series, , is then given by:
. (1)
I use this formula on xt series corresponding to M3 growth, µt; adjusted
money growth, 5t ≡ µt − ∆yt , where ∆yt denotes the growth rate of  real GDP;
and inflation, πt. I refer to the resulting -series as ‘trend money growth’,
‘adjusted trend money growth’ or ‘trend inflation’. All series are measured on
an annualized quarterly basis: inflation, for example, is thus measured as 4 ×
log (pt /pt −1). The ‘smoothing parameter’, λ, is important in that ln(2)/λ
captures the time it takes for a permanent one-unit change in xt to lead to a
0.5 unit change in  (Cogley, 2002, p. 103). In Sections 2 and 3, I assume that
λ = 0.075; in Sections 5 and 6, I estimate λ.
Turning to the model, let gt denote the output gap; εt denote a residual; and
let a superscript e denote an expected value. I start from a standard, reduced-
form Phillips-curve equation:
(2)
which states that current inflation depends on expected future inflation, past
inflation and the once-lagged output gap. I use the Hodrick–Prescott filter
to construct a measure of  the gap. Since there is typically a time lag between
movements in the output gap and movements in inflation, I assume a one-
period lag.
The relative weights of  past, αb, and expected future, αf , inflation in the
determination of  inflation are of  particular interest. While theory suggests that
αf ≈ 1, a number of  studies from a range of  economies typically estimate a
much smaller value. I therefore test three hypotheses regarding these parame-
ters: that the weights on the forward and backward-looking elements sum to
unity (αf + αb = 1), that inflation is fully backward looking (αf = 0 and αb = 1)
and that it is fully forward looking (αf = 1 and αb = 0).
Next, I assume that inflation expectations depend on :
, (3)
where a constant has been disregarded. Using equations (1), (2) and (3) and
assuming , Appendix 2 derives the TPPC, which integrates monetary
factors into a standard Phillips-curve equation and which constitutes my
proposed interpretation of  the ECB’s view of  the inflation process:
πt = β1µ t−1 + β2gt−1 + β3πt−1 + β4gt−2 + β5πt−2 + et, (4)
where β1 = αfλ, β2 = αg, β3 = (1 − λ + αb), β4 = −(1 − λ)αg, β5 = −(1 − λ)αb
and et = εt − ρεt−1 where ρ = 1 − λ. This equation is more complicated than a
traditional Phillips curve, but has a straightforward interpretation.
  xt*
  x x xt t t*    (   ) *= + − −λ λ1 1
  xt*
xt*
π α π α π α εt f t
e
b t g t tg      ,= + + ++ − −1 1 1
  xt t t t*  *, *  *= µ π5 or
  π t
e
tx+ −=1 1  *
  xt t*  *= µ
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First, nominal money growth, my proposed representation of  the first pillar,
enters because it influences trend money growth, which in turn impacts
on inflation expectations. The impact of  money growth depends on λ, which
captures how rapidly expectations change when money growth changes, and
the extent to which inflation is forward looking, α f . Only if  αf = λ = 1 is there
a one-to-one relationship between (past) money growth and inflation.
Second, inflation depends on the output gap, which should be thought of  as
a shortcut for the many factors that enter in the second pillar. Needless to say,
in a fully specified model it would be desirable to incorporate other elements
capturing cost-push factors such as import and energy prices and changes in
value added taxes.
Third, once-lagged inflation enters the equation for two reasons. Past inflation
matters in the standard Phillips curve given by equation (2). The importance
of  this factor depends on αb. Furthermore, past inflation captures the importance
of  , which plays a role in determining  as evidenced by the term (1 − λ).
Fourth, gt−2 and πt−2 enter, provided that λ < 1. Thus, these variables appear
solely because of  the assumed expectations-formation process. To see this most
clearly, note that gt−2 and πt−2 do not enter the equation if  λ = 1, in which case
expected future inflation is given by µt−1.
Fifth, the error term follows an MA(1) model with a coefficient that depends
on λ. Of  course, this results from the assumption that the εt -errors are serially
uncorrelated, which need not be the case. Preliminary estimates suggested that
the restriction that the moving-average parameter equals (1 − λ) was rejected
for the full sample period. Indeed, and as shown by Figure 7, quarterly
  µt−1*   µt*
Figure 7. CPI inflation
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changes of  inflation display large negative first-order autocorrelation. This may
be related to the way in which the price data are constructed or deseasonal-
ized. I therefore do not impose the theoretical restriction that the moving-
average parameter equals (1 − λ), but rather estimate it as a free parameter, ρ.
Thus, I fit et = εt − ρεt−1.
It is important to note that the β i-parameters in the model depend on the
underlying coefficients (αf, αg, αb, λ). To fit the model thus entails estimating
these latter parameters rather than the β i’s. The model is estimated by writing
equation (4) in state-space form and using the Kalman filter to evaluate the
likelihood function.
In modelling the ECB’s view of  the inflation process, I want to stay as close as
possible to generally accepted macroeconomic building blocks. I therefore start from
a standard Phillips-curve relationship that states that current inflation depends on
expected future inflation, past inflation and the output gap.14 As in Section 3, I use
estimates of  the output gap constructed using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. Since,
empirically, there is typically a time lag between movements in the output gap and
movements in inflation, I assume a one period lag. Before proceeding, I emphasize
that Phillips curves are best seen as reduced-form relationships and therefore may
shift if  the policy regime changes.
An important aspect of  Phillips-curve models concerns the relative weight of  past
and expected future inflation in the determination of  inflation. While theory suggests
that expected future inflation should play a dominant role, a number of  studies from
a range of  economies indicate that past inflation may be more important. It is there-
fore of  interest to test the hypotheses that the weights on the forward and backward-
looking elements sum to unity, that inflation is fully backward looking and that it is
fully forward looking.
To estimate the Phillips curve, the treatment of  expected future inflation needs to
be determined. The second building block of  the model is therefore the assumption
I make about how expectations are formed. If  money growth is correlated with future
inflation, as the data reviewed above suggest, then it should be correlated with inflation
expectations. In fact, the ECB (2001, p. 42) has noted that one way in which money
growth impacts on inflation is through induced movements in expected inflation:
‘High money growth may also directly influence inflationary expectations and
therefore also price developments. Similarly, low monetary growth may lead to
deflationary expectations and price developments.’15
14 Here I use the term ‘output gap’ in the older sense of  the difference between actual and detrended real GDP (as opposed to the
more modern sense of  the difference between actual real GDP and the level that would be observed if  prices were perfectly flexible).
15 This passage has been deleted in the second edition of  this volume (ECB, 2004).
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I therefore assume that trend money growth determines inflation expectations.
This specification constitutes the main novelty of  the paper and plays a critical role
in the analysis that follows. It therefore warrants several comments.
First, while the notion that money growth affects inflation expectations may
capture the spirit of  the ECB’s view of  the role of  money in the inflation process,
as suggested by the quote above, this assumption is arbitrary. However, the standard
approach to modelling inflation expectations, that is to replace expected inflation by
actual inflation and estimate the equation using statistical techniques appropriate for
the resulting errors-in-variables problem as originally suggested by McCallum (1976),
is also subject to important problems.16 It is, from this perspective, interesting that
several recent studies have modelled inflation using survey measures of  expected
inflation.17 It therefore seems appropriate to consider competing measures of
expected inflation in the euro area.
Second, since money growth does not enter the Phillips curve, it does not impact
directly on inflation. One therefore wonders why it should impact indirectly through
inflation expectations. To my mind, the assumption that money growth determines
expected inflation should not be taken literally. The correlation between money
growth and future inflation that has been established in the literature implies, how-
ever, that money growth is correlated with expected inflation. I therefore interpret the
ECB as believing that money growth captures the stance of  monetary policy and the
general state of  aggregate demand, and that it therefore can be used as a proxy for
expected inflation. The public, of  course, may form their inflation expectations by
looking at a broader set of  variables and need not focus on money growth, although
the fact that money growth and future inflation have been strongly correlated, for
whatever reason, suggests that that would not be an unreasonable shortcut to take.
Third, the assumption that money growth impacts on inflation expectations gives
rise to a direct channel from money to prices. Nelson (2003) argues that monetarist
models hold that changes in money growth impact on prices indirectly through the
level of  aggregate demand and the output gap, and therefore do not require such a
direct effect. By contrast, Galí (2003) appears to view such a direct mechanism as an
important precondition for the use of  the first pillar.
Fourth, while I interpret the ECB as believing that inflation expectations depend
on current and past nominal money growth, I consider two other specifications.
Since the quantity theory suggests that inflation is determined by the difference
between money and real income growth, I also estimate the model using adjusted
16 In applied work, this approach is implemented by assuming that the expectation errors are uncorrelated with the regressors,
which are used as instruments. If  the regressors involve variables that are not instantaneously observed (such as the output gap
or recent inflation rates), this assumption leads to inconsistent estimates. While in principle this problem can be overcome by
using lagged values of  the instruments, in practice the information lags are unknown. Furthermore, this approach is silent on
what factors determine inflation expectations. This modelling approach is thus also subject to arbitrary assumptions.
17 Adam and Padula (2003) study euro area and Roberts (1997 and 1998) investigates US data. Paloviita (2003) estimates
forward-looking inflation equations on euro-area data, proxying expected inflation by OECD forecasts.
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trend money growth. Moreover, since recent inflation is just as likely as money growth
to be informative about future inflation, I also explore how well the model fits when
trend inflation is used to model inflation expectations.
Fifth, since trend inflation depends on current inflation by construction, I lag it
once to use it as a regressor in the inflation equation.
4.2. The two-pillar Phillips curve
Combining the Phillips curve, the expectations hypothesis and the definition of  trend
money growth discussed in Box 4, Appendix 2 shows how I can obtain a forecasting
model for inflation, the ‘two-pillar Phillips curve’ (TPPC), that constitutes my pro-
posed interpretation of  the ECB’s view of  the inflation process. That equation can be
thought of  as integrating monetary factors in a conventional reduced-form Phillips
curve. The monetary analysis of  the first pillar is captured by the assumption that
expected inflation depends on trend money growth, while the economic analysis of
the second pillar is captured by the output gap.
Before estimating the model, it is desirable to consider what would happen if
the assumption that money growth can serve as a proxy for inflation expectations is
wrong. How would this impact on the empirical results?
First, consider the case in which inflation expectations incorrectly are modelled
using trend money growth. Since trend money growth in this case contains little
information useful for forecasting inflation, one would expect the weight on expected
future inflation to be small and insignificant and instead the weight on past inflation
to be large and significant, given the fact that inflation is strongly autocorrelated.
As I show below, however, the opposite is true: the weight on expected future inflation
is generally much larger and more significant than the weight on past inflation.
Second, if  money growth were not correlated with future inflation, one would
expect that assuming that trend inflation rather than trend money growth determines
inflation expectations would improve the fit of  the model since current inflation is
closely tied to trend inflation. The results below, however, consistently show that the
model fits much worse if  trend inflation is used instead of  trend money growth.
Overall, the results are difficult to reconcile with the notion that money growth does
not contain incremental information that is useful for predicting future inflation.
5. FITTING THE DATA
5.1. Estimates
Table 1 provides estimates for the sample period 1971Q1–2003Q1. For the time
being, I do not impose any restrictions on the degree to which expectations are
forward or backward looking. The estimates in the first column, where I assume
that money growth drives expected inflation, are quite encouraging. The smoothing
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parameter is highly significant and estimated to be 0.089, which is close to the 0.075
value assumed by Gerlach (2003) and implies a half-life of  7.8 quarters. The estima-
tion suggests that the weight on future inflation is close to unity and is statistically
significant. In turn, the weight on past inflation is 0.03 and highly insignificant. The
parameter on the output gap is 0.55 and significant. Finally, the moving average
parameter is 0.45. Since this is statistically significantly different from the value
implied by the model (which is one minus the estimated value of  the smoothing
parameter: 1 − 0.089 = 0.911) there is some evidence against it.
In column 2 I consider the case in which expected future inflation is determined
by adjusted money growth. The results are broadly similar to those just reviewed,
with three differences. First, the point estimate of  the smoothing parameter is larger,
0.13, implying a faster impact of  money growth on expected inflation (half-life of  5.5
quarters). Second, the estimated impact of  the output gap is 1.11 rather than 0.55.
The reason for this is that adjusted trend money growth (which contains a moving
average of  past quarterly changes in income) and the output gap are negatively
correlated. Third, the log likelihood is higher than before, implying that the model
fits the data better when adjusted money growth is used as an explanatory variable
for expected inflation.
As noted above, the most natural counter-argument to the notion that money is
important in judging future price pressures is that any information that is contained
in observations on recent money growth rates must surely already be embedded in
recent inflation rates. If  so, rather than focusing on recent and past money growth
rates in assessing the ‘risks to price stability’, it would make much better sense to
Table 1. Estimates of  π t = β + β1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β1 = α fλ, β2 = αg, β3 = 1 − λ + αb, β4 = −(1 − λ)αg, β5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = εt − ρεt−1
Sample period 1971Q1–2003Q1
xt Money growth, µt Adjusted money growth, 5t Inflation, πt
Constant, β −0.003* 
(0.002)
−0.002 
(0.001)
0.001 
(0.001)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.089** 
(0.035)
0.129*** 
(0.032)
0.224** 
(0.106)
Expected future inflation, αf 1.041*** 
(0.243)
1.080*** 
(0.225)
0.922*** 
(0.228)
Past inflation, αb 0.029 
(0.172)
0.020 
(0.182)
0.005 
(0.232)
Output gap, αg 0.553*** 
(0.141)
1.141*** 
(0.259)
0.628*** 
(0.146)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 0.447** 
(0.191)
0.436** 
(0.194)
0.468*** 
(0.197)
σ 2 1.12*10−4 1.09*10−4 1.19*10−4
Log likelihood 403.631 405.521 399.641
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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concentrate on recent inflation rates. To assess this argument, I also consider the case
in which expected future inflation is modelled as depending on trend inflation. The
results, in column 3 of  Table 1, are surprising. While most parameter estimates are
similar to those obtained when inflation expectations are modelled as being tied to
the growth rates of  money or adjusted money, the fit of  the model is clearly worse as
evidenced by the sharp decline in the value of  the likelihood function. The second
major difference is that the smoothing parameter is much larger, 0.22, implying a
half-life of  3.2 quarters.
5.2. Summary
In this section I have confronted the model for inflation arising from my proposed
interpretation of  the ECB’s monetary pillar with the data over the period 1971Q1–
2003Q1. While preliminary, these results are moderately encouraging in that the
parameters are significant and take plausible values. The estimates of  the extent to
which inflation is backward looking are particularly interesting. In contrast to what
one would expect from the literature, this parameter is numerically close to zero and
statistically insignificant.
Next, I therefore refine the empirical work in two dimensions. First, I estimate the
model for two sub-periods. I do so because it may be that while money growth played
an important role in the high-inflation period in the 1970s and early 1980s, it lost its
significance in the low-inflation environment of  the 1990s. Gerlach (2003) presents
evidence that suggests that the relationship between money growth and inflation in
the euro area differed before and after 1992. The first subsample is the high-inflation
period between 1971Q1 and 1991Q4, during which inflation averaged 7.1% per
annum. The second is the low-inflation period 1992Q1–2003Q1, in which annual
inflation averaged 2.3%.
The second refinement is that I investigate more closely some of  the restrictions of
the model. For instance, can I reject the hypothesis that the sum of  the parameters on
past and expected future inflation is unity or that inflation is entirely forward looking?
6. SUBSAMPLE ESTIMATES
6.1. Inflation in the euro area before 1992
In Table 2 I re-estimate the model on data ending in 1991Q4, assuming that nominal
money growth determines inflation expectations. Column 1 shows the results when I
do not impose the restriction on the moving-average parameter.18 Interestingly, in this
case I cannot reject this restriction and I therefore impose it. The results in column
18 The restriction on the moving average parameter is given by ρ = 1 – λ.
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2 indicate that the sum of  the weights on the forward- and backward-looking components
is marginally above unity, but not significantly so. I therefore introduce this restriction
as well (column 3). However, in this case the smoothing parameter is not significantly
different from zero. While the degree to which inflation is forward looking is only about
0.27, I impose the restriction that inflation is fully forward looking, which leads to a
sharp fall in the likelihood function. Overall, I therefore conclude that the empirical
model fits the data quite well in the first subsample when inflation expectations are
modelled as depending on money growth and if  inflation is assumed to be part forward,
part backward looking.
Next, I turn to the case in which inflation expectations are modelled as determined
by adjusted money growth. Interestingly, the results in Table 3 indicate that the
model in this case fits the data better, as evidenced by the uniform increase in the
value of  the likelihood function. The value of  the smoothing parameter is also con-
sistently higher than in Table 2 (around 0.2 rather than 0.1), indicating a shorter half-
life, and is more significant. As in the case of  Table 2, the point estimates in column
1 suggest that I can impose the restriction on the moving average parameter and I
do so in column 2. In column 3 I also impose the restriction that the sum of  the
weights on expected future inflation and past inflation is unity. This results in an
estimate of  the degree to which inflation is forward looking of  0.36, which is some-
what higher than in Table 2. Finally, I restrict inflation to be fully forward looking,
which again leads to a large fall in the value of  the likelihood function.
In Table 4 I turn to the case in which inflation expectations are assumed to depend
on trend inflation. The results are generally similar to those in Table 2, except that
the fit of  the equation is worse than before, as evidenced by the value of  the likelihood
Table 2. Estimates of  π t = β + β 1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β1 = α fλ, β 2 = α g, β 3 = 1 − λ + αb, β4 = −(1 − λ)α g, β 5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = εt − ρεt−1
Sample period 1971Q1–1991Q4
xt Money growth, µt
Constant, β −0.003*** 
(0.000)
−0.002*** 
(0.001)
−0.001* 
(0.001)
−0.004** 
(0.001)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.090** 
(0.036)
0.079** 
(0.037)
0.151 
(0.100)
0.111***
(0.024)
Expected future inflation, αf 0.492*** 
(0.139)
0.516*** 
(0.190)
0.269*** 
(0.085)
1
Past inflation, αb 0.681*** 
(0.066)
0.664*** 
(0.088)
(1 − αf ) 0
Output gap, αg 0.280** 
(0.117)
0.356*** 
(0.136)
0.306** 
(0.122)
0.673***
(0.178)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 0.968*** 
(0.043)
(1 − λ) (1 − λ) (1 − λ)
σ 2 1.13*10−4 1.16*10−4 1.21*10−4 3.02*10−4
Log likelihood 261.118 260.656 259.135 220.385
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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function. In particular, the results in column 1 suggest that the smoothing parameter is
insignificant and I therefore impose the restriction on the moving-average parameter.
The value of  the likelihood function is essentially unaffected (column 2). Since
the sum of  the weights on expected and realized inflation is close to unity, I also
impose that restriction. While the value of  the likelihood function in this case rises
somewhat, the parameter estimates are largely unchanged, except for the smoothing
Table 3. Estimates of  π t = β + β 1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β1 = α fλ, β2 = αg, β3 = 1 − λ + αb, β 4 = −(1 − λ)α g, β 5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = ε t − ρε t−1
Sample period 1971Q1–1991Q4
Table 4. Estimates of  π t = β + β1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β1 = α fλ, β2 = αg, β3 = 1 − λ + αb, β4 = −(1 − λ)αg, β 5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = εt − ρεt−1
Sample period 1971Q1–1991Q4
xt Adjusted money growth, 5t
Constant, β −0.002** 
(0.001)
−0.002*** 
(0.001)
−0.001 
(0.000)
−0.001** 
(0.001)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.196*** 
(0.053)
0.188*** 
(0.053)
0.243*** 
(0.089)
0.236*** 
(0.047)
Expected future inflation, αf 0.518*** 
(0.145)
0.546*** 
(0.135)
0.361*** 
(0.084)
1
Past inflation, αb 0.612*** 
(0.096)
0.582*** 
(0.087)
(1 − αf) 0
Output gap, αg 0.672*** 
(0.191)
0.714*** 
(0.171)
0.609*** 
(0.147)
1.345*** 
(0.146)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 0.841*** 
(0.106)
(1 − λ) (1 − λ) (1 − λ)
σ 2 1.10*10−4 1.12*10−4 1.16*10−4 2.14*10−4
Log likelihood 262.609 262.456 260.778 235.306
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
xt Inflation, πt
Constant, β 0.001 
(0.003)
0.001 
(0.002)
0.000 
(0.000)
0.000 
(0.001)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.240 
(0.203)
0.327 
(0.254)
0.232* 
(0.128)
0.647*** 
(0.125)
Expected future inflation, αf 0.647 
(0.426)
0.440* 
(0.260)
0.429** 
(0.197)
1
Past inflation, αb 0.259 
(0.480)
0.505* 
(0.266)
(1 − αf ) 0
Output gap, αg 0.581*** 
(0.207)
0.454** 
(0.178)
0.496*** 
(0.159)
0.346** 
(0.140)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 0.535 
(0.418)
(1 − λ) (1 − λ) (1 − λ)
σ 2 1.27*10−4 1.29*10−4 1.30*10−4 1.37*10−4
Log likelihood 257.324 256.499 256.000 254.249
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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parameter, which falls in size but becomes significant. Interestingly, the degree to
which inflation is forward looking is in this case estimated to be about 0.43, which is
significantly different from unity. Not surprisingly, imposing the restriction that the
weight on expected future inflation is unity and the weight on past inflation is zero
(column 4) leads to a deterioration of  the fit.
In sum, the results for the first sample period indicate that the model fits relatively
well although inflation expectations appear largely backward looking.19 Furthermore,
the model typically fits worse when expected inflation is assumed to depend on trend
inflation rather than on either of  the measures of  trend money growth.
6.2. Inflation in the euro area after 1991
Next I turn to the results for the post-1991 period which are inherently more
interesting than the results for the 1971–91 period for the simple reason that even
the ECB’s most vocal critics would probably be willing to accept that money was useful
for forecasting and assessing inflation in the high inflation era. The point of  contention
is rather whether money is useful in the current low-inflation environment (see the
discussion in Begg et al., 2002, in particular Box 2 on p. 21).
In Table 5 I therefore report re-estimates of  the results in Table 2, using data for
the period 1992Q1–2003Q1. Since the results are similar to those above, I review
19 One reason for this may be that since money demand depends inversely on the inflation rate, the decline in inflation in the first
subsample raised the demand for money and led to a situation in which money growth (and therefore my proposed measure of
expected inflation) exceeded headline inflation. Of  course, this highlights one difficulty in extracting information from money growth.
Table 5. Estimates of  π t = β + β 1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β1 = α fλ, β2 = αg, β3 = 1 − λ + αb, β4 = −(1 − λ)αg, β5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = εt − ρεt−1
Sample period 1992Q1–2003Q1
xt Money growth, µt
Constant, β −0.003*** 
(0.000)
−0.003** 
(0.002)
−0.003*** 
(0.001)
−0.003*** 
(0.001)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.088*** 
(0.026)
0.081** 
(0.040)
0.083*** 
(0.017)
0.084*** 
(0.024)
Expected future inflation, αf 1.053*** 
(0.171)
1.227* 
(0.667)
1.173*** 
(0.102)
1
Past inflation, αb −0.132 
(0.139)
−0.162 
(0.129)
(1 − αf) 0
Output gap, αg 0.491*** 
(0.137)
0.542*** 
(0.159)
0.540*** 
(0.122)
0.475*** 
(0.128)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 0.979*** 
(0.252)
(1 − λ) (1 − λ) (1 − λ)
σ 2 5.52*10−5 5.71*10−5 5.43*10−5 6.05*10−5
Log likelihood 155.503 155.075 155.015 154.291
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10 / 5 / 1% level.
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them quite quickly. Note first that the moving average parameter is close to one minus
the smoothing parameter, which implies that the degree of  autocorrelation in the
residuals is compatible with the model, and that the sum of  the weights on past and
expected future inflation is about unity. Imposing these restrictions yields the model in
column 3, for which I do not reject the hypothesis that the weight on past inflation
is zero and the weight on expected future inflation is unity. I therefore also impose these
restrictions and obtain the model in column 4 in which all parameters are highly signific-
ant. The smoothing parameter is estimated to be 0.084, implying a half-life of  8.2 quarters.
Note that while the model in column 1 involves seven parameters, the model
in column 4 involves only four. I can thus test whether the restrictions imposed by
the simple empirical model are rejected, but find that they are not.20 This implies that
the notions that inflation is fully forward looking and that the expectations-formation
mechanism is the only source of  the serial correlation in the errors are compatible
with the data. Furthermore, I can also use the models estimated for the sub-periods
to test for parameter constancy before and after 1991–92. In this case, however, I
reject the hypothesis.21 The main reason for this appears to be that inflation is more
forward looking in the second subsample.
Before turning to the issue regarding what these results imply, if  anything, for the
two-pillar framework, I redo the analysis for the case in which expected inflation is
modelled as depending on adjusted trend money growth (Table 6) and trend inflation
(Table 7). Since these estimates are very similar, in the interest of  brevity I merely
highlight the most interesting points.
First, judging by the values of  the likelihood functions, it appears that the model fits
best when nominal money growth is used, marginally less well when adjusted money
growth is used, and much worse when trend inflation is used to model expected inflation.
Second, the estimate of  the parameter on the output gap is much larger in the case
when adjusted rather than actual money growth is used. Again, this result arises
because of  the correlation between the output gap and adjusted money growth.
Third, the restrictions imposed by the model in column 4 on that in column 1 are
not rejected for the case of  adjusted money growth, but are rejected in the case in
which trend inflation is used to capture inflation expectations.22
6.3. Stability 1991–2003
The results so far show that the parameters are typically significant and of  plausible
magnitude. However, the hypothesis that the parameters are the same in the pre- and
20 The p-value from a likelihood ratio test is 0.489.
21 Focusing on the model in column 1, note that the value of  the likelihood function when estimated over the full sample is
(from Table 1) 403.631. The likelihoods for the sub-samples are 261.118 (from Table 3) and 155.503 (Table 5), or 416.621 in
total. Thus, the likelihood increases by 12.990 when I estimate the model twice, that is, when I estimate 14 rather then 7
parameters. A chi-squared test with 7 degrees of  freedom yields a p-value of  zero, implying that I reject the hypothesis that the
parameters are the same in the two subsamples.
22 The p-values are 0.305 and 0.048, respectively.
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post-1991 sample is rejected, most likely because the extent to which inflation is
forward looking has increased over time. Since a number of  authors have argued
that the information content of  money is likely to be lower at lower average rates
of  inflation, it is of  particular interest to investigate more closely the stability of  the
Table 6. Estimates of  π t = β + β 1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β1 = α fλ, β 2 = α g, β 3 = 1 − λ + αb, β 4 = −(1 − λ)α g, β5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = εt − ρεt−1
Sample period 1992Q1–2003Q1
xt Adjusted money growth, 5t
Constant, β 0.000 
(0.001)
0.000 
(0.001)
−0.001*** 
(0.000)
−0.001*** 
(0.000)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.120*** 
(0.036)
0.116*** 
(0.044)
0.094*** 
(0.020)
0.094*** 
(0.019)
Expected future inflation, αf 0.733** 
(0.298)
0.701** 
(0.294)
1.094*** 
(0.103)
1
Past inflation, αb −0.118 
(0.151)
−0.153 
(0.136)
(1 − αf ) 0
Output gap, αg 0.876*** 
(0.224)
0.825*** 
(0.204)
1.084*** 
(0.163)
1.008*** 
(0.158)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 1.002 
(5.241)
(1 − λ) (1 − λ) (1 − λ)
σ 2 5.52*10−5 5.95*10−5 6.14*10−5 6.21*10−5
Log likelihood 155.037 154.314 153.484 153.225
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
Table 7. Estimates of  π t = β + β 1xt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β 3π t−1 + β 4 gt−2 + β 5π t−2 + et
where β 1 = α fλ, β 2 = αg, β 3 = 1 − λ + αb, β 4 = −(1 − λ)α g, β5 = −(1 − λ)αb, and et = εt − ρεt−1
Sample period 1992Q1–2003Q1
xt Inflation, πt
Constant, β 0.003 
(0.002)
0.003* 
(0.002)
0.000 
(0.000)
0.000 
(0.000)
Smoothing parameter, λ 0.347 
(0.721)
0.338* 
(0.186)
0.265* 
(0.149)
0.192* 
(0.101)
Expected future inflation, αf 1.019 
(1.185)
1.002** 
(0.484)
1.281*** 
(0.243)
1
Past inflation, αb −0.432 
(0.566)
−0.426 
(0.354)
(1 − αf ) 0
Output gap, αg 0.178 
(0.213)
0.179 
(0.197)
0.331* 
(0.195)
0.386** 
(0.172)
MA(1) parameter, ρ 0.664*** 
(0.187)
(1 − λ) (1 − λ) (1 − λ)
σ 2 6.63*10−5 6.64*10−5 7.63*10−5 7.82*10−5
Log likelihood 152.324 152.324 149.087 148.370
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* / ** / *** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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inflation equation in the 1991–2003 period.23 I do so by presenting recursive esti-
mates of  the model. In the interest of  brevity, I focus on the model in which expected
inflation is driven by trend money growth since that appears to fit the data best.
Furthermore, since the model is estimated by maximizing the likelihood function,
convergence problems may arise if  I estimate versions of  the model containing insig-
nificant parameters. I therefore consider the relatively restricted version of  the model
in column 4 of  Table 5 in which the parameter on expected future inflation is unity,
the parameter on past inflation is zero and the restriction on the moving-average
parameter is imposed. That gives me four parameters to estimate: the degree of
smoothing, the impact of  the output gap on inflation, a constant and the variance of
the errors. For space reasons, I only plot the recursive estimates of  the first two
parameters, since these are the most interesting. The estimates are obtained by
initializing the model on data for the period 1987Q1–1991Q1 and then expanding
the sample period by adding one observation at a time.
Figure 8 shows the results for the smoothing parameter together with a 95%
confidence band. While the confidence band becomes narrower as observations are
added, the point estimate remains relatively constant. Overall, the figure suggests that
the smoothing parameter is stable in the 1991–2003 period. While the results for the
23 Gerlach (1995) demonstrates that the relationship between inflation and money growth is weaker for economies with low
money growth and low inflation. See also De Grauwe and Polan (2001), De Grauwe (2002) and Begg et al. (2002).
Figure 8. Recursive estimates of  smoothing parameter
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coefficient on the output gap in Figure 9 also support the notion that the parameter
is stable, the point estimate is rising modestly as the sample size is expanded. More
interestingly, the parameter is only significant for samples ending in 2001 or later. I
view these results as suggesting that it is difficult to find a strong link between inflation
and the output gap in short samples.
6.4. Interpretation
The estimates for the period 1992–2003 give rise to a simple Phillips curve. To see
this, note that the model performs best when inflation expectations are modelled as
depending on trend money growth and that I do not reject the hypothesis that
inflation is fully forward looking. This two-pillar Phillips curve says that inflation at
any point in time depends on the two pillars.24 First, inflation depends on trend
money growth, the first pillar, with a unit coefficient. Changes in trend money
growth, which evolves gradually over time, consequently explain gradual changes in
the level of  inflation over time. However, and as discussed by Nelson (2003), in
empirical work on inflation dynamics the determination of  steady-state inflation is
typically downplayed. In empirical research on ‘old-Keynesian’ or new-Keynesian
24 In the notation of  Box 4 and disregarding time subscripts, we have that π = µ* + α gg + e.
Figure 9. Recursive estimates of  impact of  output gap
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Phillips curves, authors assume that the steady-state rate of  inflation is constant and
capture this with an intercept (see Galí and Gertler, 1999) or by first removing a time
trend from inflation (see Coenen and Wieland, 2003).25 Gerlach and Svensson (2003)
instead capture trend shifts in inflation in the euro area by assuming that they arise
from movements in central banks’ inflation objectives. The analysis in this paper
suggests that while money may not be useful for explaining movements of  inflation
around the steady state, it is helpful for understanding changes over time in the steady state.
Second, inflation also depends on the output gap, which should be understood as
a catch-all for the economic analysis of  the second pillar. As noted above, it would be
desirable to incorporate proxies for other shocks that impact on prices. As the model
currently stands, these influences are subsumed in the errors.
Finally, note that under the hypothesis that past inflation is more informative for
future inflation than past money growth, we would have expected the model to fit
best when trend inflation is assumed to determine expected inflation, or the weight
on expected inflation to be close to zero and insignificant. However, and as discussed
above, the model fits best when the weight on expected inflation is close to unity and
money growth is assumed to influence inflation expectations.
6.5. Expected inflation
Before concluding this section, I return to the critical assumption of  the model
proposed above that trend money growth determines expected inflation. Since this
assumption is non-standard and is likely to be controversial, it is desirable to explore
how plausible it is. While this is difficult to do in the absence of  good data on inflation
expectations, next I compute the expected rate of  inflation implied in the estimates
of  the inflation equation in the 1992–2003 period and compare it with two data sets
on expected inflation in the euro area. The first of  these is that used by Paloviita (2003),
which is derived from OECD forecasts, for the economies constituting the euro area.
Unfortunately, this measure pertains to the private consumption deflator rather than
to the CPI. Moreover, the data are annual rather than quarterly. The second measure
stems from forecasts by Consensus Economics for inflation 1–10 years ahead in some
of  the economies constituting the euro area. These forecasts are published in April
and October. One problem with this measure is that it is based solely on data for
Germany, Italy and France before 1995, when data for the Netherlands and Spain
are added. It is consequently not representative of  the overall euro area.
Figure 10 shows the quarterly rate of  inflation together with the expected rate of  inflation
from my model and from Paloviita (2003). Note that actual and (the model-dependent
measure of ) expected inflation both decelerate between 1992 and 1997, remain roughly
25 One reason for this approach is that, for statistical reasons, it is desirable to focus on time series that fluctuate around a fixed
mean (that is, are stationary) rather than time series that trend over time.
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constant for a few years, and start to accelerate towards the end of  the sample, and
that Paloviita’s measure of  expected inflation evolves in much the same way over time
as the model-dependent measure. In Figure 11, I replace Paloviita’s measure with
that arising from forecasts from Consensus Economics with horizons of  one or
two years. While these variables evolve over time in the same way as actual inflation
and (the model-dependent measure of ) expected inflation, they are systematically
below these in the first part of  the sample. This is probably due to the fact that the
Consensus Economics measures of  expected inflation do not cover the full euro area.
Overall I interpret these figures as suggesting that the estimate of  expected inflation
implied by the model is plausible.
6.6. Summary of the empirical results
The empirical analysis presented above shows that it is in fact possible, contrary
to the ECB’s claim, to integrate money in an explicit forecasting model of  inflation.
Moreover, I believe that the model provides a plausible interpretation of  the ECB’s
two-pillar framework and that it fits the data about as well as many other ad hoc
models of  inflation. A particularly interesting aspect of  the results is that the empirical
models fit the data better if  expected inflation is assumed to depend on actual or
adjusted money growth rather than past inflation. This suggests that money does in
Figure 10. Actual and expected inflation
426 STEFAN GERLACH
fact contain information about future inflation in the euro area beyond that embed-
ded in the output gap and past inflation. It also appears that the model fits better
when estimated on data for the low-inflation period after 1991 than on data from the
1970s and 80s. This finding calls into question the claim in the literature that the link
between money and inflation is statistically less clear at low inflation rates.
7. CONCLUSIONS
What, then, do I conclude from the analysis regarding the desirability of  the monetary
pillar? To answer this question, it seems useful to proceed by first asking whether money
can serve as an indicator, or information, variable for inflation and, if  so, whether it
should have its own pillar.
7.1. Money as an indicator
Does money growth contain information about the future rate of  inflation in the euro
area? Economists at the ECB and elsewhere have presented evidence that consistently
suggests that there is a stable relationship between money growth and inflation in the
euro area and that money growth does contain information useful in forecasting
future inflation. Moreover, Gerlach and Svensson (2003) estimate an inflation equa-
tion for the euro area that incorporates money explicitly into the analysis and find
Figure 11. Actual and expected inflation
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that money plays about as important a role for future inflation as the output gap. My
interpretation of  the broad statistical evidence is that it is difficult to deny that money
growth appears to contain information about future inflation in the euro area.26
Of  course, that conclusion could be challenged by noting that while this has been
true in the past, there is no reason to assume that it will remain true also in the future.
The information content of  money depends on the relative importance of  the differ-
ent shocks that are hitting the economy, which may vary over time. For instance, as
argued by Begg et al. (2002), money may be more informative about future prices
during episodes in which it is growing quickly and subject to large supply distur-
bances, leading to high and volatile inflation, than in episodes characterized by low
and stable inflation such as that which the euro area is experiencing currently. How-
ever, Issing et al. (2001, p. 13) present evidence that the correlation between money
growth and inflation appears high also in low-inflation environments, defined as
periods with an average inflation rate of  below 20%.
While undoubtedly valid, the critique that money growth may be an unreliable
indicator of  future inflation because it depends on the relative importance of  the
shocks impinging on the economy applies with equal force to other commonly used
indicator variables.27 For instance, the information content of  the output gap (which
suffers from the additional complication that it is unobservable and needs to be
estimated) is likely to depend on the relative importance of  shocks to aggregate
demand and supply.28 Similarly, the information content of  the slope of  the term
structure of  interest rates may depend on the nature of  the monetary policy regime,
as demonstrated by Estrella (2003).
Another potential argument against the use of  money as an information variable
is that while it is correlated with future information, it contains little information
beyond that embedded in recently observed inflation rates. However, it is a striking
finding that information variables typically do not improve much on univariate fore-
casts of  future goal variables (e.g. Stock and Watson, 2003). Thus, money may not be
much worse (or better) than other commonly used information variables.29
On balance, I believe that money growth is one of  many useful indicator variables
for inflation in the euro area.
7.2. A pillar for money?
Do these findings imply that money should be given a separate pillar in the ECB’s
monetary policy strategy? The empirical work presented above suggests that M3
26 I thus do not share the sentiment in Galí (2003, p. 58) that ‘the existing evidence even seems to question the “information
content” of  monetary aggregates.’
27 Stock and Watson (2003) discuss reasons why the information content of  indicator variables may shift over time.
28 Here I am referring to the output gap in the sense of  the difference between actual and ‘detrended’ output.
29 Of  course and as noted above, theory suggests that information variables ought not to be too informative about future inflation
since, if  they were, the central banks should react to them in setting policy and thus reduce their information content ( Woodford, 1994).
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growth contains information about future inflation in the euro area that is not already
embedded in the current rate of  inflation or in the output gap. Overall the paper is best
seen as demonstrating how that information can be combined with non-monetary
indicators to form the ‘broadly based assessment of  the outlook for future price
developments and the risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole’ that consti-
tutes the ECB’s second pillar. To my mind, there is nothing in the analysis suggesting
that money should be treated differently from any other indicator of  inflation pres-
sures. In particular, the model does not imply that it is the best predictor of  future
inflation. I therefore do not interpret the empirical work in this paper as implying
that a separate pillar for money growth is required. Rather, I view it as merely
providing further evidence that it is desirable for the ECB to extract whatever
information about future inflation it can from data on monetary aggregates when
setting interest rates.
Discussion
Frank Browne
Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland
Stefan Gerlach is to be congratulated on a very interesting paper and a brave attempt
to integrate the two pillars of  the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. Stefan starts from
the proposition that there is a need for a model of  the ECB’s two-pillar framework.
He then proposes such a model incorporating money explicitly. This is particularly
interesting in light of  the ECB’s argument that ‘it is not practically feasible to
combine these two forms of  analysis in a transparent manner in a single analytical
framework’.30 This could mean one of  two things. It could mean that the theoretical
foundations for the first pillar (largely monetarist) and the second pillar (largely new
Keynesian) are not capable of  being reconciled within a single framework because
they subscribe to quite different views of  the inflationary process. Alternatively, the
statement could reflect the fact that most monetarist models of  inflation are single
equation reduced forms (such as the P* model, for example) while the second pillar
of  the ECB’s strategy is to build on an elaborate structural model, or more accurately
elaborate structural models,31 and structural and reduced form models cannot be
integrated into ‘a single analytical approach’. Moreover, integrating money into a
structural econometric model seems to be very difficult since nobody seems to have
done it successfully to date. If  the ECB is correct for either of  these reasons, it makes
the task that Stefan has set himself  a very difficult one.
30 Quoted by Stefan in his paper.
31 There is both a euro area-wide structural model and a model that interlinks the structural models of  individual member
countries.
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Decades of  financial innovation have tended to erode the differences between
financial instruments making them increasingly substitutable for one another. If  we
add to this improvement in access technologies to financial markets that has increased
the ease, and reduced the cost, of  participating in these markets, we see that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to identify the demand for any subset of  these assets
(called money) that will continue to be stable under a variety of  institutional, struc-
tural and fiscal shocks. Although the effect of  these developments is to reduce the
information content in monetary aggregates that is useful for monetary policy, I don’t
think it means that this information is entirely useless. If  more attention were to be
paid to the effects of  financial innovation and these institutional, structural and fiscal
changes in real time, and the appropriate corrections made for the resulting velocity
shifts, then monetary aggregates could still be useful indicators for the central bank
and could even warrant a special status among all indicators. An interesting example
of  this is given by Orphanides and Porter (2001) who argue that the trend increase
in velocity throughout almost all of  the 1990s in the US could have been picked up
in real time, in which case the demand for money function would have remained a
stable function of  the standard arguments when the appropriate adjustment for the
change in trend velocity is made.
Even before the recent change in emphasis with respect to what was previously the
first pillar, the two pillars were not treated on an equal footing, in the context of  the
inflation forecasts, in the sense that equal analytical attention was not paid to both of
them. The analysis under the second pillar dominates discussion on the inflation
projections within the Eurosystem and, while there is a forecast of  inflation produced
using the first pillar, this is used merely as a cross check on the projections from the
broad macroeconomic analysis (second pillar).
Stefan introduces money into his analysis by assuming that a moving average of
money growth determines inflation expectations. I would have some difficulty with a
model in which excess money does not disturb the relationship between aggregate
demand and supply, generating inflationary tensions in the process, but does at the
same time determine inflation expectations. If  money does not affect objective behav-
iour of  economic agents, it is hard to see how it would impact on their expectations
of  that behaviour. I think if  money is to be integrated into the two-pillar framework,
it has to be done according to a monetarist interpretation, which is based on the idea
that money affects behaviour via liquidity constraints.
Patrick Honohan
World Bank and CEPR
The nostalgic slogan as lullaby?
A simplified motto for the Bundesbank’s approach to monetary policy over the years
could be ‘We operate on monetary conditions to keep inflation low.’ This also evokes
the monetary pillar of  the ECB’s stated approach, and echoes ancient debates. In
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particular, it reflects the view that the hyperinflation of  1922 was not the work of
foreign speculators or of  self-fulfilling expectations, but instead was due to excessive
money creation. Such a slogan also gave the institution a nominal anchor – perhaps
unimportant when inflation is low and anti-inflation consensus strong, but a cudgel
with which to beat opponents if  and when pressure to accommodate other goals
threatens to produce creeping inflation such as that which emerged in the 1970s, even
in Germany.
Although most central banks in advanced countries behave in similar ways nowa-
days, they do so in very different rhetorical environments. For example, the US Fed
was founded to ensure a greater ‘elasticity of  money supply in response to the variable
needs of  business’ (a task in which it conspicuously failed in 1931–33), and its rhetoric
tends to reflect that apparently broader remit. By evoking slogans that justified and
underpinned the Bundesbank’s credibility in the past, the inclusion of  the monetary
pillar in the ECB’s stated strategy should probably best be seen as an attempt to sing
a lullaby as the German public are gently moved from one bed to another.
What the data say
Turning from rhetoric to econometrics, money is of  course not unimportant in the
inflationary process. Stefan Gerlach proposes the following model to fit price inflation
π for the whole period 1971–2003: ignoring a constant,
(1)
This is interpreted in the paper as an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve (though
that term more properly refers to a wage inflation–unemployment relation): a rela-
tionship between inflation, the output gap ( g ) and an exponentially weighted average
of  past monetary growth, interpreted as a (somewhat nonstandard) inflation expecta-
tions term.32
Actually, the same equation can be rewritten in the equivalent but arguably simpler
form:
∆πt = λ (µ t− i − π t−1) + αg g t−1 + α g g ∆g t−1 + εt (2)
where
α g g = − (1 − λ)α g (3)
Unless restriction (3) is satisfied – which I doubt – we are left with the unrestricted
equation (2) as a representation of  the data. This is just an error-correction model
(money growth and inflation do not seem to have unit roots in the data, but that
representation is nevertheless valid). It features both the change and level of  the
32 The adequacy of  this weighted average as an inflation expectations proxy is not assessed directly in the paper: Section 6.5
instead compares predictions from a regression such as (1) with survey expectations data.
π λ µ α εt i t i g t ti g     = + +
−
− −
=
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output gap as the short-term part (there is a long tradition going back to Lipsey of
including both level and change of  gap variables), and money growth (rather than Gerlach’s
trend money growth interpreted as inflation expectation) as the long-term driver.
So here is a rather simple monetarist relationship which might seem to underpin
the ECB’s monetary pillar. This is reinforced by the finding – not unrelated – that
monetary growth helps forecast price inflation even after taking account of  inflation’s
past history.
The business of  central banks is money: these new findings seem to support the
relevance of  that role. So why do so many monetary economists question the empha-
sis, diluted though it evidently is, on money in the ECB’s statement of  its policy
approach? One reason is that there are more macro series than just m, p and g.
A glance at any issue of  the Bank of  England’s Inflation Report shows the range of
indicators that can usefully be taken into account in assessing inflation prospects. It
is not surprising that m has a valuable role if  it is almost the only explanatory variable
tried: it would appear less central if  other variables were allowed to compete.
Which money matters?
But there is a stronger reason for not over-emphasizing the monetary pillar in prac-
tical policy formation (and I do recognize that the ECB does not overemphasize it in
practice). Here, too, history is revealing. The heyday of  monetarist activism – the
1970s and 1980s – revealed the limitations of  money as a sole guide to monetary
policy. The aggressive policy contractions in the US and UK from 1979 had to cope
with relatively sharp shifts in money demand. If  a rigid monetary growth target had
been adhered to in both cases, the contraction would have been substantially over-
shot. Among the causes of  the shifting relationship were the sensitivity of  money
demand to the expected rate of  inflation and rapid structural change in banking and
finance, eroding the dividing lines which allowed the monetary aggregates to be
defined in an unambiguous manner. Goodhart’s law may also have been at work. As
a result of  this chastening experience, few central bankers will now risk getting locked
into a monetary straitjacket.
And structural change in finance is not going away. To see this, consider the recent
experience of  zero or negligible correlation between money growth and inflation in
the accession countries, plotted in Figure 12. If  the ECB’s anti-inflationary policy
framework is to accommodate these, I fear that money will have to retreat into the
background even more.
But perhaps the accession countries do not matter in this context because of  their
modest economic size or because their Eurozone membership is still some time in the
future. If  the accession countries are to be neglected in this way, it will be in a long
tradition of  ignoring the periphery. Indeed, the ECB monetary series used in the
paper’s regression is rather problematic for the more distant past. This may explain
why the parameter estimates are rather different for the period 1971–91, and why
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the models ‘fit better’ for the later period. In forming the monetary aggregate, each
national currency is converted at the irrevocable euro conversion rates of  end-1998.
This greatly underweights the countries that had high inflation pre-EMU relative to
Germany (and other low-inflation states). Italy’s monetary growth in the early 1970s
is underweight (relative to Germany) by a factor of  5.5: i.e. 1971 DMs are valued at
990 Italian liras, compared with an actual 1971 market exchange rate of  171. The
underweighting factor for Spain is 4.5, for Finland 2.7, for France and Ireland about
2 (for Greece, more than 20). Perhaps none of  this matters and the ‘politically correct’
use of  theological conversion factors is more important than economic reality, but
several other approaches that have been used in the literature, from series computed
by weighting average monetary growth rates with GDP shares, to simply marking all
quantities to market at current exchange rates (see Coenen and Vega, 2001, for a
discussion: the choice does not matter too much for the period back to 1981, but of
course the problem becomes more severe if  the heterogeneous inflationary experi-
ences of  the 1970s are included in the sample).
How monetarist should one be?
One element that may be missing from the preferred specification is what Phillips (of
the curve) would have called ‘integral adjustment’. A simple monetarist equilibrium
would predict not only equality of  money and price growth rates, but proportionality
of  their levels (apart from the effects of  structural change in equilibrium velocity).
Unless the economy is always on its money demand curve, a monetary overhang
could continue to drive inflation even when money growth had been halted. Even if
Figure 12. Accession countries: M2 and CPI growth
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the goal is to remain in the highly simplified world of  m, p and g, it would be satisfying
to close this potential loophole in the model, say by adding the lagged real money
stock – perhaps detrended – to the list of  explanatory variables. Even though central
banks typically allow base drift (a missed inflation target in one year does not trigger
a lower target for the next in order to bring the price level back on track), their models
of  inflation need to recognize the effects of  stock disequilibrium.
Panel discussion
Stefan Gerlach replied to the discussion of  Patrick Honohan that the empirical
analysis is most interesting for the low-inflation period since 1991. Data measurement
issues for earlier years do not drive those results. Moreover, he emphasized that the
filter used in the paper can be consistent with rational expectations. Philip Lane
agreed with Patrick Honohan in viewing money growth as a nominal anchor. Trend
inflation, which is measured more precisely but is more difficult to communicate to
the public, would be more appropriate in that role. Several panelists wondered
how much predictive power money actually has for future inflation. Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas pointed out that the two-pillar Phillips curve implicitly assumes that trend
inflation does not perform as well as money growth to predict future inflation. He
also mentioned recent work on policy co-ordination as a possible rationale for noisy
policy rules, which may play a role in preventing expectation traps. A comparison of
the ECB with central banks in countries with pure inflation targeting could pinpoint
differences between different central banks’ beliefs about how the world works. Rich-
ard Portes noted that the ECB’s reference value for money growth should be adjusted
if  productivity growth, as pointed out by the ECB itself, is as slow as it appears to be
in the Euro area’s recent experience.
APPENDIX 1. REDUCED-FORM EVIDENCE
Below I present some reduced-form evidence on the information contained in money
growth for future inflation in the euro area. To this end, I estimate prediction equa-
tions of  the form (suppressing the constant):
and study whether the spread between trend and headline inflation, , is cor-
related with the change in headline inflation over the coming j quarters, πt+j − πt. In
the empirical work below I explore forecasting horizons of  two, four, eight and twelve
quarters ( j = 2, 4, 8 and 12).
To understand the results, it is helpful to consider the interpretation of  the param-
eters. The coefficient φπ captures the extent to which the wedge between trend and
  π π φ π π φ φ µ π ξπt j t t t g t m t t tg+ − = − + + − +    ( *  )    ( *  * )  
  π πt t*  −
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headline inflation predicts future changes in headline inflation. Generally one would
expect φπ to be positive and significant. Moreover, since it may take some time for
this wedge to be undone, φπ is likely to rise with the length of  the forecast horizon, j,
and approach unity for longer horizons. The coefficient φg provides information
about the extent to which the output gap impacts on future inflation. Given the
importance many central banks attach to the output gap, one would expect φg to be
positive and significant. Since movements in the output gap are transitory although
persistent, it is possible that the importance of  the output gap declines with the
forecast horizon. Finally, the coefficient φm captures the information content of  money
growth. The hypothesis is that headline inflation will rise if  trend money growth is
exceeding trend inflation. A finding of  a positive and significant φm would indicate
that money is informative for future changes in inflation even in the presence of  the
output gap and the discrepancy between trend and headline inflation.
To estimate this model I use data for three sample periods. I first consider the full
sample period of  1970Q2–2003Q1. Since the proposition that the high inflation
observed in the 1970s was related to the rapid money growth is probably not too
controversial, I also estimate the equation for the first subperiod ending in 1986Q4
and a second subperiod starting in 1987Q1. Since theory suggests that there should
be serial correlation in the residuals of  order j − 1, I allow for this in estimation.
Table A1 provides the results. To understand the table, consider the results for the
full sample when a forecast horizon of  two quarters ( j = 2) is used. The estimate of
φπ indicates that if  trend inflation is one percentage point above headline inflation,
the latter is predicted to rise by 0.17 percentage points in the coming two quarters.
The p-value for a test of  the hypothesis that the parameter is zero is 9.5% and the
adjusted R-squared is 4.6%.
Next I add the output gap to the regression. I find that φg is positive and highly
significant ( p = 1.6%) and that the adjusted R-squared rises to 12.0%. Furthermore,
φπ rises to 0.28 and becomes highly significant ( p = 0.2%). This implies that the
output gap contains information about future changes in inflation in addition to that
embedded in the wedge between trend and headline inflation.
I proceed by also including trend money growth relative to trend inflation in the
regression. I find that φm is highly significant ( p = 0.0%) and that the adjusted R-
squared rises further to 28.0%. However, the estimate of  φg declines and its signifi-
cance falls ( p = 5.4%).
Overall, the results for the full sample period show that money growth contains
information for future changes in inflation, irrespectively of  the time horizon consid-
ered and whether or not the output gap is included. The output gap is also signifi-
cant, at least at the 10% level, for j = 2, 4 and 12 when money is excluded from the
model. However, when money is included, it is only significant for j = 2 (and then
with a p-value of  5.4%). The wedge between trend and headline inflation is generally
significant, with the point estimate of  φπ approaching unity for longer forecast hori-
zons and in fact exceeding unity, but not significantly so, for j = 12. Furthermore, the
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Table A1. Estimates of  
Forecast 
horizon j 
(quarters)
Sample period: 1970Q2–2003Q1 Sample period: 1970Q2–1986Q4 Sample period: 1987Q1–2003Q1
φπ φg φm adj. R2 φπ φg φm adj. R2 φπ φg φm adj. R2
2 0.159 
[0.125]
0.038 0.105 
[0.344]
0.009 0.532 
[0.000]
0.209
2 0.277 
[0.002]
0.469 
[0.016]
0.120 0.244 
[0.029]
0.578 
[0.058]
0.113 0.694 
[0.000]
0.415 
[0.006]
0.284
2 0.401 
[0.000]
0.315 
[0.054]
0.652 
[0.000]
0.280 0.380 
[0.000]
0.407 
[0.078]
0.678 
[0.000]
0.327 0.787 
[0.000]
0.322 
[0.018]
0.528 
[0.010]
0.313
2 0.341 
[0.000]
0.725 
[0.000]
0.248 0.302 
[0.002]
0.750 
[0.000]
0.281 0.706 
[0.001]
0.706 
[0.007]
0.278
4 0.272 
[0.072]
0.068 0.224 
[0.192]
0.039 0.604 
[0.000]
0.239
4 0.398 
[0.006]
0.501 
[0.080]
0.117 0.347 
[0.048]
0.514 
[0.241]
0.070 0.837 
[0.000]
0.599 
[0.000]
0.389
4 0.632 
[0.000]
0.211 
[0.363]
1.227 
[0.000]
0.442 0.620 
[0.000]
0.172 
[0.543]
1.354 
[0.000]
0.497 0.922 
[0.000]
0.514 
[0.000]
0.479 
[0.016]
0.408
4 0.591 
[0.000]
1.277 
[0.000]
0.437 0.587 
[0.000]
1.385 
[0.000]
0.500 0.792 
[0.000]
0.763 
[0.001]
0.310
8 0.432 
[0.006]
0.105 0.368 
[0.037]
0.068 0.868 
[0.000]
0.361
8 0.502 
[0.003]
0.280 
[0.199]
0.108 0.432 
[0.026]
0.266 
[0.372]
0.061 1.035 
[0.000]
0.429 
[0.011]
0.409
8 0.874 
[0.000]
−0.181 
[0.496]
1.947 
[0.000]
0.595 0.874 
[0.000]
−0.289 
[0.374]
2.195 
[0.000]
0.706 1.096 
[0.000]
0.368 
[0.037]
0.345 
[0.400]
0.409
8 0.909 
[0.000]
1.905 
[0.000]
0.594 0.930 
[0.000]
2.144 
[0.000]
0.703 1.003 
[0.000]
0.548 
[0.184]
0.380
12 0.624 
[0.001]
0.161 0.602 
[0.004]
0.139 0.836 
[0.000]
0.308
12 0.743 
[0.000]
0.467 
[0.093]
0.174 0.765 
[0.000]
0.681 
[0.064]
0.157 0.915 
[0.000]
0.184 
[0.409]
0.304
12 1.158 
[0.000]
−0.098 
[0.739]
2.217 
[0.000]
0.629 1.283 
[0.000]
0.030 
[0.914]
2.570 
[0.000]
0.768 0.880 
[0.000]
0.229 
[0.366]
−0.200 
[0.751]
0.294
12 1.177 
[0.000]
2.193 
[0.000]
0.632 1.277 
[0.000]
2.575 
[0.000]
0.771 0.820 
[0.000]
−0.056 
[0.917]
0.295
Notes: p-values in brackets. All equations are estimated with GMM. The standard errors are computed allowing for serially correlated errors and heteroscedasticity.
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adjusted R-squareds are consistently considerably higher when money growth is
included in the model. Overall, these results suggest that money does contain
information useful for predicting future changes in inflation.
Next I turn to the results for the two subsamples. Several findings are readily
apparent. First, after 1986 money growth is generally less, and the output gap more,
significant, particularly so for longer forecast horizons ( j = 8 and 12). Interestingly,
models estimated for the second subsample which include the output gap among the
regressors have typically much higher adjusted R-squareds than the others. This is
supportive of  the notion that the information content of  money has declined over time
and that, if  anything, the output gap may have become more useful for predicting
changes in inflation. However, money growth appears to remain informative about
future inflation in the post-1987 period for j = 2 and 4.
APPENDIX 2. DERIVING THE TWO-PILLAR PHILLIPS CURVE
To obtain the TPPC, I start from the inflation equation and the definition of  expected
inflation:
(A1)
. (A2)
Trend money growth is given by:
. (A3)
I can write the inflation equation in the compact form:
(A4)
where zt ≡ πt − αbπt−1 − αg gt−1. Note that (A4) implies that 
Substituting (A3) into (A4) I obtain:
(A5)
or
zt = αf λµt−1 + (1 − λ)zt−1 + εt − (1 − λ)εt−1 (A6)
Using the definition of  zt, the final inflation equation can be written as:
πt = β1µt−1 + β 2 gt−1 + β3πt−1 + β4gt−2 + β 5πt−2 + et , (A7)
where β1 = α fλ, β2 = αg, β3 = (1 − λ + αb), β4 = −(1 − λ)αg, β5 = −(1 − λ)αb and et =
εt – ρεt−1 and ρ = (1 – λ).
Note that obtaining significant estimates of  the βi’s is not sufficient to conclude that
the model is valid. In fact, a finding that money and the lagged output gap matter
(β1, β2 > 0), that the parameter on lagged inflation is significant and has a plausible
π α π α π α εt f t
e
b t g t tg        ,= + + ++ − −1 1 1
π µte t+ −=1 1  *
  µ λµ λ µt t t− − −= + −1 1 21*     (   ) *
zt f t t  *   = +−α µ ε1
µ ε αt t t fz− − −= −2 1 1*   (   )/ .
zt f t f t t    (   ) *   = + − +− −α λ µ α λ µ ε1 21
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value (0 < β3 ≤ 1) and that the coefficients on the twice-lagged output gap and
inflation are insignificant does not, on its own, provide support for the model. Rather,
the underlying parameters – the degrees to which inflation is forward (αf ) and back-
ward looking (αb), the impact of  the output gap on inflation (αg ) and the extent to
which past money growth determines inflation expectations (λ) – need to be signifi-
cant and of  plausible magnitude. In particular, I would expect that 0 ≤ αf , αb ≤ 1, αf
+ αb ≈ 1, αg > 0 and that λ is significant and ‘reasonably’ close to the 0.075 value
used by Gerlach (2003). Moreover, the errors should obey a first-order MA structure.
Furthermore, the fact that there are seven parameters in the empirical model (a
constant, five βi parameters, and σ 2), but only six parameters in the ‘structural’ model
(a constant, α f, αg, αb, λ, σ 2) implies that there are testable restrictions. Moreover,
there are only five parameters if  the restriction that α f + αb = 1 is imposed, and four
if  I also assume that α f = 1. In sum, the model, while simple, imposes conditions that
the data must satisfy.
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